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Summary 
We live in a world that faces the possibility of disasters in many different shapes and with a myriad of 
interdependencies. In order to develop sustainability these disasters must be managed. It requires an 
approach to disaster management that has the ability to anticipate, recognise, adapt to and learn from 
events. Risk and vulnerability assessments are important in order to anticipate further risks as well as 
to assess them and support the process of adapting to them. 
Risk and vulnerability assessments are conducted on all levels of the Swedish disaster management 
system and are an important tool to support decision making. Decisions are made on all levels of the 
system depending on their extent. The Swedish system relies on a bottom-up approach, which entails 
that risk management decisions are mainly made on the level closest to the risk. Today there is a 
limited knowledge regarding how risk and vulnerability assessments are utilised as an input to 
decision making on the regional and national levels in Sweden. The purpose of this thesis is to 
describe how the assessments are utilised. 
To do this, an interview study with twelve semi-structured interviews was performed with respondents 
on the national and regional level of the Swedish disaster management system. The interviews resulted 
in the conclusion that risk and vulnerability assessments are appreciated as a tool for decision support. 
Despite this there is a weak connection between the assessments and the risk-reducing measures taken 
since it is unclear how suggested measures are implemented and followed-up on. Another conclusion 
is that risk evaluation is not an obvious part of the risk and vulnerability assessments since half of the 
respondents did not include it when asked about what a risk and vulnerability assessment should 
contain. 
In order to utilise the full potential of the risk and vulnerability assessments it is important that there is 
efficient and effective communication between the different levels of the Swedish disaster 
management system. The results from the interviews conducted within this thesis imply that there is 
less awareness about how the assessments are received and utilised by the level above compared to the 
level below. A frustration about the process is identified from emotions shown and weaknesses 
identified during the interviews. This frustration is perceived to be deeper on the national level 
compared to the regional level of the Swedish disaster management system. 
The conclusions drawn from this thesis imply that the work with risk and vulnerability assessments in 
the Swedish disaster management system can be improved. By reducing the frequency of performing 
assessments would enable increased possibilities to implement and follow up suggested risk-reducing 
measures. This together with increased emphasis on risk evaluation and communication between the 
different levels of the disaster management system will positively impact the society’s ability to 
anticipate and adapt to the uncertainty of the future. Thereby, our society will become more resilient. 
  
  
 
  
  
Sammanfattning 
Vi lever i en värld som hotas av olika katastrofer med olika beroenden. För att samhället ska fortsätta 
utvecklas på ett hållbart sätt behöver katastroferna hanteras. Det ställer krav på samhällets funktioner 
att förutsäga, identifiera, anpassa sig till och dra lärdomar från händelser. Ett verktyg som idag 
används för att göra detta är risk- och sårbarhetsanalyser som har förmågan att förutsäga och utvärdera 
risker och stödja processen med att hantera dem. 
Risk- och sårbarhetsanalyser görs på alla nivåer i det svenska krishanteringssystemet och är ett viktigt 
verktyg för att stödja beslutsfattande. Beslut rörande katastrofriskreducering tas på alla systemets 
nivåer. Det svenska systemet är decentraliserat vilket innebär att besluten generellt sett tas av de som 
har risken inom sitt ansvarsområde. Idag föreligger det oklarheter kring hur risk- och 
sårbarhetsanalyser används som beslutsunderlag. Detta examensarbete ämnar att beskriva hur 
situationen ser ut på nationell och regional nivå idag. 
För att undersöka hur risk- och sårbarhetsanalyserna används genomförs en intervjustudie bestående 
av tolv semistrukturerade intervjuer med sex respondenter från den nationella och sex respondenter 
från den regionala nivån i det svenska krishanteringssystemet. Intervjuerna visar på att risk- och 
sårbarhetsanalyser är ett uppskattat beslutsstöd. Trots det är kopplingen mellan analyserna och 
genomförandet av riskreducerande åtgärder svag eftersom uppföljningen av föreslagna åtgärder och 
deras implementeringsgrad är oklar. Vidare är riskvärdering inte en given del av risk- och 
sårbarhetsanalyserna då detta endast togs upp som en del av risk- och sårbarhetsanalysen i hälften av 
intervjuerna. 
För att analyserna ska nå sin fulla potential är det viktigt med god kommunikation mellan de olika 
nivåerna i det svenska krishanteringssystemet. Resultaten från intervjuerna visar på att kunskapen om 
hur risk- och sårbarhetsanalyserna mottas och används på de högre nivåerna är lägre jämfört med 
nivåerna under. Det går även att identifiera en frustration kring processen baserat på de känslor som 
uttrycktes och de svagheter som nämnts under intervjuerna. Frustrationen upplevs som större på den 
nationella nivån jämfört med den regionala. 
De slutsatser som dragits i denna uppsats visar på att processen kring risk- och sårbarhetsanalyser 
inom det svenska krishanteringssystemet kan förbättras. Genom att minska frekvensen på dessa 
analyser ges ökade möjligheter till genomförande och uppföljning av föreslagna riskreducerande 
åtgärder. Detta tillsammans med ökat fokus på riskvärdering och kommunikation mellan de olika 
nivåerna i krishanteringssystemet skulle utveckla samhällets förmåga att förutse och anpassa sig till 
framtidens osäkerheter vilket skulle öka vårt samhälles resiliens. 
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1 Introduction 
We live in a world that is uncertain, complex, ambiguous and dynamic. Societies face the possibility 
of disasters in many different shapes and with a myriad of interdependencies. Disasters may come in 
hydrometeorological, geological, biological, accidental or antagonistic form and cross both 
geographical and organisational borders. These disasters must be managed in order to develop 
sustainability, which requires an approach to disaster management that can anticipate, recognise, adapt 
to and learn from these changes and interdependencies (Becker, 2014, pp.147-148). Risk and 
vulnerability assessments have the ability to anticipate future risk scenarios and assess them to decide 
on ways to manage the risks. If done successfully, this will contribute to create a society that is less 
impacted by disturbances and thereby has a larger potential of developing in a way that is desired. 
Assessing risks does not necessarily mean that all possible events are identified. There will always be 
a possibility of surprising extreme events relative to the present knowledge and beliefs (Aven, 2013, p. 
49). These events are difficult to anticipate but risk and vulnerability assessments increase the 
knowledge-base for decision makers. That in turn makes it more likely that relevant decisions are 
made regarding what risks to address as well as ways to manage them. 
It is said that beauty lies in the eyes of the beholder and this can also be applied to risk. The concept of 
what risk is differs from person to person and creates ambiguities when assessing and presenting risk 
(Klinke & Renn, 2002, pp. 1072-1073). Risk and vulnerability assessments are structured ways of 
identifying what might affect the assessed system, what consequences may be expected and the 
uncertainties regarding for example the likelihood of the events and the extent of the consequences. 
Thus, the assessors view on what risk is will shape the assessment.  
Risk and vulnerability assessments are an important part of the Swedish disaster management system 
and are supposed to be used as a first step in the process of reducing risk and vulnerability in society 
as well as to increase the ability to mitigate the effects of, and respond to, extraordinary events (MSB 
2011, pp. 5-6). In Sweden risk and vulnerability assessments are made on three different levels; on the 
local level by municipalities, on the regional level by County Administrative Boards and on the 
national level by national authorities (MSB, 2015a). 
The work with risk and vulnerability assessments is important on all levels in the society. The 
municipal assessments are the basis for the regional assessments and these regional assessments lay 
the groundwork to the national assessment (MSB, 2011, p. 17). All levels of the disaster management 
system need to work satisfactory. The work on the local level is important since the Swedish crisis 
management system relies on three principles: the responsibility principle, the proximity principle and 
the equality principle. These three principles could be summarised into that the ones who have the 
responsibility during normal conditions should keep it during a crisis, the work should take place 
where the crisis occurs and should be performed by the ones that are closest concerned with as small 
changes in the organisation as possible (Prop. 2005/06:133). Therefore the local and the regional 
levels are important stakeholders when the society faces a crisis. 
It is stated by law that every national authority in Sweden should analyse their own risks and threats 
with the purpose to strengthen both their own preparedness as well as the preparedness of the society 
(SFS 2006:942). In addition to the law the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency has supplementary 
regulations about both required headlines included in the risk and vulnerability assessments as well as 
indicators on disaster management that should be analysed regarding whether they are fulfilled or not 
(MSBFS 2015:3; MSBFS 2015:5). 
Despite the laws and regulations there is a quite strong agreement that the work with risk and 
vulnerability assessments and the aggregation of information in these has not reached its full potential 
in Sweden. Hence, there are differences in quality of the assessments in the disaster management 
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system, which makes the aggregation of assessments on the regional and national level problematic 
(Abrahamsson & Tehler, 2013, p. 89). This can partly be contributed to the fact that there are many 
stakeholders who describe the same issues in different ways and use different vocabularies (Månsson, 
Abrahamsson, Hassel & Tehler, 2015, pp. 8-11). However, the connection between risk and 
vulnerability assessments and decisions on how to reduce risk is not solely dependent on the 
possibility to aggregate information. There is a limited knowledge regarding how risk and 
vulnerability assessments are utilised as an input to decision making and what the professionals 
working in the field think about them. Today more research is done on the local and regional level 
compared to the regional and national level, see for example Hassel (2012); Abrahamsson and Tehler 
(2013) and Lin, Nilsson, Sjölin, Abrahamsson and Tehler (2015). Therefore this thesis will focus on 
the regional and national level in Sweden. 
The purpose of this work is to perform a descriptive study of how risk and vulnerability assessments 
are utilised as input to decision making in the field of disaster management at the national and regional 
levels in Sweden. 
In order to fulfil the purpose, the following research question will be answered: 
 How are risk and vulnerability assessments utilised in the decision making process for disaster 
management at the national and regional levels in Sweden? 
Answering this question will create an understanding about the different views on risk and 
vulnerability assessments and their importance for decision making on the national and regional levels 
of the Swedish disaster management system today. On the regional level focus lies on the County 
Administrative Boards since they have an important coordinating role within the Swedish disaster 
management system. The national level is represented by national authorities who are also required to 
perform risk and vulnerability assessments. 
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2 Theoretical background 
A risk and vulnerability assessment is a decision support tool that enlightens risks in an area around 
which decisions need to be made, for example to decide where to focus funding in order to create a 
safer society. Risk and vulnerability assessments can be seen as a special case of a traditional risk 
assessment where more focus is placed on vulnerabilities. A traditional risk assessment contains three 
steps: risk identification, analysis and evaluation (SS-ISO 31000:2009). A vulnerability assessment 
can be seen as a natural part of a risk assessment since vulnerability is a part of risk (Aven, 2007, p. 
748). Thus a risk and vulnerability assessment should have a clear focus on vulnerabilities in the 
system. This section defines the concepts of risk and vulnerability used in this thesis and covers the 
basic parts of a risk and vulnerability assessment. The assessments will look different depending on in 
which context they are utilised, their purpose and the approach to risk used by the assessor and will 
thereby give different inputs to decision makers (Klinke & Renn, 2002, pp. 1072-1073). 
2.1 Defining risk and vulnerability 
Today there is no consensus on how risk is defined in the engineering context (Aven, 2012, p. 33). 
Thereby, it could be problematic to define a meaningful probability model which is the case with risk 
and vulnerability assessments. Risk is unknown, not because of the degree of knowledge, risk is 
unknown because the future cannot be foreseen (Aven, 2011, p. 518). Therefore a definition that 
includes the uncertainty associated to the event and its consequences is used in this thesis. The 
approach used is the ACU-framework proposed by Aven (2011, pp. 1080-1082): 
Risk = (A, C, U)  
A: What can go wrong? (the initiating events) 
C: The consequence of these events if they should occur. 
U: Associated uncertainties. Will A occur and what value will C take? 
This framework also enables concepts such as vulnerability and capabilities to be included. 
Vulnerability can be seen as a combination of possible consequences and associated uncertainties 
given a hazard (Aven, 2007, p. 747). A hazard is an occurrence that, when interacting with a 
vulnerability, has adverse effects (Coppola, 2011, p. 176). As an example, the hazard hurricane can be 
used, which if it occurs on a desert island creates no adverse effects while if it strikes a populated 
island could result in a disaster depending on the islands vulnerability to hurricanes. 
The ACU-framework of risk and vulnerability allows a broad definition of uncertainty, not only as 
frequencies or probabilities. Such quantitative measures of uncertainty are uncommonly used in risk 
and vulnerability assessments in Sweden (Månsson, Abrahamsson, Hassel & Tehler, 2015, pp. 2-3). 
2.2 Risk and vulnerability assessments 
As stated before, risk and vulnerability assessments will look different depending on the approach to 
risk used by the assessor and will thereby give different inputs to decision makers (Klinke & Renn, 
2002, pp. 1072-1073). The ACU-framework uses an approach to risk that can be related to the classic 
risk triplet named by Kaplan and Garrick (1981) including identification of events, their likelihood and 
the consequences if they happen. 
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2.2.1 Risk identification 
A risk and vulnerability assessment has to start with an identification of the risks relevant for the 
system analysed. In this part of the assessment the first question in the risk triplet is answered. The 
question is: 
 What can happen? 
Consequently, the A in the ACU-framework is defined. In order to identify risks within a system, a 
clear definition of the system and its context is necessary in order for the assessment to be of a 
manageable magnitude. This definition should be done before the assessors start with the risk 
identification. This step is one of the most critical steps of the assessment since the risks that are not 
identified will not be taken into consideration during the assessment. The identification phase is a 
systematic process with the goal of identifying all possible events in order to get a complete picture of 
the current situation and to recognise those risks that need to be researched further (MSB, 2011, p. 41). 
After identifying risks, they need to be analysed to be of use in supporting decisions.  
2.2.2 Risk and vulnerability analysis 
In this part of the assessment the last two questions in the risk triplet are answered regarding all risks 
identified in the risk identification phase. This part is related to the C and U in the ACU-framework. 
The questions asked are (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981, p. 13): 
 How likely is it that the event will happen? 
 If it does happen, what are the consequences? 
Since risk is ambiguous and uncertain, the analysis should show this and aim to reduce the 
uncertainties stemming from lack of knowledge of the risk in question. Uncertainties from the natural 
variability that cannot be foreseen are not treated. It is important to clearly show what assumptions 
have been made and what effect they might have on the result of the analysis. The answers to the 
questions above can be presented in many different forms; from entirely qualitative to entirely 
quantitative likelihoods and consequences depending on the available knowledge, available time and 
the purpose of the assessment (SS-ISO 31000:2009, p. 18). 
Analysing vulnerability concerns a more detailed analysis of how the system is affected by a specific 
hazard from the perspective of critical functions of the system (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, 
2011, p. 34). The analysis results in identified vulnerabilities related to a certain hazard, which is 
identified in the risk analysis (MSB, 2011, pp. 53-54). 
2.2.3 Risk evaluation 
When having analysed the risks the results need to be evaluated regarding their acceptability and 
manageability. This is preferably done by the risk assessors together with those affected by the risk to 
address their concerns as well as the assessed magnitude of the risk (Klinke & Renn, 2002, p. 1076). 
Risk-reducing measures should be evaluated regarding their effect on the risk levels (MSB, 2011, p. 
50). Depending on the background of the assessors and their approach to risk the evaluation may look 
different. Therefore, evaluation criteria should be decided before the identification and analysis takes 
place (Coppola, 2011, p. 162). Still, the assessors’ approach to risk will affect the evaluation. 
There are two main opposing approaches to risk; the constructualist and the realist approach (Klinke & 
Renn, 2002, pp. 1072-1073), which can influence the evaluation. These approaches are extremes and 
in reality professionals tend to lean towards one or another. The constructualists consider risk as a 
mental construction and that risk and vulnerability assessments thereby are subjective while the 
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realists argue that risk can be quantified and the risk and vulnerability assessments are a true 
representation of the reality. The realists argue that the decision making process requires a quantitative 
way of expressing risk to help the decision makers to prioritise risks compared to the costs and 
benefits (Kaplan, Garrick, 1980, p. 11). On the other hand, a risk assessor has to choose the way to 
measure risk, present it and determine levels of exposure and since there is no right frame to do this 
risk becomes subjective (Slovic, 2011, pp. 20-21). 
Depending on the assessors’ and the decision makers’ approaches to risk, different aspects of the risk 
will receive different amount of attention. People perceive risk differently depending on the source of 
the risk and its characteristics. Depending on whether the exposure to the risk is voluntary or 
involuntary people are more or less willing to accept it. The same thing applies to for example whether 
risk is old or new or if there are consequences for future generations (Slovic, 1987, p. 282). 
A widely used way of describing and evaluating risk is using risk matrices where the likelihood and 
consequence of an event forms the axes of a matrix and the events are plotted into the matrix. An 
example of a risk matrix can be seen in figure 1. This helps visualising and comparing different risks 
as well as the effects of risk-reducing measures. A risk matrix can be a very effective tool for decision 
makers prioritise between different risks. The results displayed in a risk matrix can easily be 
manoeuvred depending on the level of detail used when describing it. Despite this it is a useful tool to 
visualise a coarse snapshot of the identified risks (MSB, 2011, p. 53). Another important thing to keep 
in mind when using risk matrices is that consequences exist in different areas that are hard, if not 
impossible, to compare such as human, environmental and economic consequences. 
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Figure 1. Schematic image of a risk matrix. The consequences can differ between for example human, 
environmental and economic but they would have to be separated between different matrices. Likelihoods can be 
described in different ways, from qualitative to quantitative. 
In addition to risk matrices Coppola (2011) writes about the SMAUG approach to risk evaluation, 
where each identified hazard is evaluated against the five parameters seriousness, manageability, 
acceptability, urgency and growth presented in table 1 (pp. 164-165). This way of evaluating risk 
provides decision makers with different aspects of risk and is a good complement to risk matrices 
since it provides different angles of evaluating risks and anticipates the development of the risks over 
time. 
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Table 1. A description of the parameters within the SMAUG approach to risk evaluation. Based on Coppola 
(2011, p. 165) 
Parameter Answers the question 
Seriousness How severe are the consequences of the risk? 
Manageability Is the risk manageable or not? 
Acceptability 
Is the risk acceptable from a social, political, legal, environmental or 
economic point of view? 
Urgency 
Is there an urgent need to manage the risk or could it be managed later with 
little or no repercussions? 
Growth Will the risk increase over time or will it remain static? 
The risk evaluation is the part of a risk and vulnerability assessment that provides the most important 
input to decision makers. Utilising snapshots of risk provided by risk matrices in collaboration with 
more transient pictures such as those provided by using the SMAUG approach when evaluating risk 
contributes to anticipate and adapt to the possible unwanted events of the future. 
2.3 Disaster management and the Swedish disaster management system 
The aim with the Swedish disaster management system is to protect life and health, infrastructure and 
values of societal importance from risks and hazards. The aim is met through planning, preparedness, 
prevention, response and recovery (MSB, 2015b). This section will describe functions for reducing 
disaster risk, principles of the Swedish disaster management system as well as the laws and regulations 
governing it. 
2.3.1 Functions for managing disaster risk 
Risk and vulnerability assessments are used as a decision support tool when working to reduce disaster 
risk. Societies have always been vulnerable to hazards and consequently in need of creating a safer 
environment either by reducing the occurrence of hazards (reducing likelihood) or by reducing the 
severity of their impact (reducing consequence). Risk and vulnerability assessments help identifying 
the likelihoods and consequences of a hazard and thereby also identifying ways to reduce the risks. 
The reduction is mainly done in two different ways; mitigation and preparedness. The disaster 
management concept also contains the reactive functions of response and recovery (Coppola, 2011, p. 
10), which are not directly applicable in the context of this thesis and will therefore not be treated. The 
disaster management concept is a parallel process as illustrated in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. The disaster management concept contain four parallel processes. Mitigation and preparedness are the 
proactive parts and response and recovery are the reactive parts. 
  
Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery
 7 
 
Mitigation is often seen as a cornerstone of disaster management and is - together with preparedness - 
the proactive part of disaster management. It concerns reducing the likelihood or consequence of 
hazards (Coppola, 2011, p. 209). Preparedness is extremely important to create effective response and 
recovery when a disaster strikes. It concerns actions taken in anticipation of a hazard to increase the 
ability to respond to and recover from its consequences (Coppola, 2011, p. 251). 
The borders between the four functions are quite diffuse and one does not reach its full potential 
without the others. These activities are used by Becker (2014) to describe the adaptive function of the 
resilience concept. Although he separates what here has been called mitigation into prevention and 
mitigation to differ between reducing the likelihood and reducing the consequence of hazards. Becker 
defines resilience in a human-environment system such as a society: 
[…] [R]esilience [is defined] as the capacity of a human–environment system to continuously 
develop along a preferred expected trajectory, while remaining within human and environmental 
boundaries. […] [S]uch resilience is an emergent property determined by the ability of the 
human–environment system to anticipate, recognize, adapt to and learn from variations, changes, 
disturbances, disruptions and disasters that may cause harm to what human beings value. 
(Becker, 2014, p. 150) 
The key point of the resilience concept relevant to this thesis is that these adaptive functions must be 
supplemented with functions to anticipate potential unwanted events, recognise that there are 
imminent or actual unwanted events taking place as well as to learn from all sorts of experience 
gathered throughout the system. A risk and vulnerability assessment is an anticipatory tool that has the 
potential to be of great importance in the process of creating resilience in a society since it can provide 
input to all of the functions mentioned, in particular the adaptive function. In Sweden risk and 
vulnerability assessments are mandatory for governmental as well as the regional and local authorities 
which creates one possibility to develop a more resilient society. 
2.3.2 Three principles in Crisis Management in Sweden 
Crisis management in Sweden relies on three principles (Prop. 2005/06:133):  
The responsibility principle: Those who have the responsibility under normal conditions also have 
the responsibility during a crisis. 
The proximity principle: The work during a crisis should be done where the crisis takes place and by 
the ones that are closest concerned. 
The equality principle: Changes in the organisation should not be larger than required during a crisis. 
The aim is as far as possible to organise the work in the same way during crisis as under normal 
conditions. 
These three principles result in that a lot of the work with risk-reducing measures should be done at a 
local level and thereby the decisions too. To enable relevant decisions the knowledge has to be shared 
between all levels in the society. 
2.3.3 Organisation of the Swedish disaster management system 
The political system in Sweden is divided into three levels: local, regional and national, shown in 
figure 3. The basis for the work is on the municipal level. Today, Sweden has 290 municipalities 
(Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting, 2015). In The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency regulations 
concerning municipalities’ risk and vulnerability assessments it is stated that every fourth year all 
municipalities should analyse their own risks and threats. The assessment should be revised and 
updated annually until the next assessment (MSBFS 2015:5). 
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The next level of the system is the regional level represented by the 21 County Administrative Boards. 
They compile the assessments from the municipalities in their county to a regional assessment (MSB, 
2011, p. 17). The County Administrative Boards and national authorities yearly send their risk and 
vulnerability assessment to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and the Government Office 
(MSBFS 2015:3), which is comprised by the different departments (SFS 1996:1515). The assessments 
are summarised by the Civil Contingencies Agency into a national risk and vulnerability assessment, 
which is sent to the Department of Justice (Försvarsdepartementet, 2014). Every country should also 
send their national risk and vulnerability assessment to the European Union every third year (MSB, 
2014). 
Sweden has 20 publically elected County Councils which, for instance, are responsible for the health 
care. They are also involved in the work with risk and vulnerability assessment but since they only 
focus on a specific part of the disaster management system they are not treated specifically in this 
thesis. 
 
Figure 3. Organisational chart over the Swedish disaster management structure (European Commission, 2014). 
The system is divided into three parts: the local level with municipalities, the regional level with County 
Administrative Boards and the national level with national authorities and the government. 
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In the Regulation of Emergency Preparedness and Increased Preparedness (SFS 2006:942) it is stated 
that every authority should annually analyse their own risks and threats with the purpose to strengthen 
both their own emergency preparedness and the preparedness of the society. The national authorities 
are divided into areas of cooperation with the aim to further analyse synergies and critical 
dependencies (MSB, 2015c, p. 4). The authorities should take the following points into account in 
their analyses and present them in their risk and vulnerability assessment (SFS 2006:942): 
1. Situations that appear rapidly and unexpected or circumstances where there is a threat or a risk 
that such a situation will develop. 
2. Situations that require fast decisions and cooperation with other stakeholders. 
3. That the most necessary and important functions can be maintained during a crisis. 
4. The ability to handle severe situations that are in line with the responsibilities of the authority. 
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency has supplementary regulations for the executions. National 
authorities should, according to 9§ SFS 2006:942: The Regulation of Emergency Preparedness and 
Increased Preparedness, present their analysis with the following headings (MSBFS 2015:3): 
1. Description of the authority and its remits. 
2. Description of the working process and the method. 
3. Identified essential critical infrastructures within the responsibility of the authority. 
4. Identified critical dependencies related to the identified essential services. 
5. Identified and analysed threats and risks within the responsibility of the authority. 
6. Estimation of the general emergency preparedness of the authority using predetermined 
indicators. 
7. Description of identified vulnerabilities and flaws in emergency preparedness within the 
authority and its responsibilities. 
8. Completed, ongoing and planned measures since the last report. 
9. Required additional measures on the occasion of the results from the assessment. 
Similar headlines are also available for the County Administrative Boards and the municipalities 
(MSBFS 2015:5; MSBFS 2015:3). 
The regulations also include predetermined indicators for estimation of the general emergency 
preparedness of the authority or municipality. The indicators are divided into different groups: 
Management, Planning, Cooperation, Communication, Competence and Resources. Each indicator 
should be analysed if it is fulfilled or not with a “Yes” or “No” together with a justification (MSBFS 
2015:5; MSBFS 2015:3). 
2.3.4 Funding 
According to the responsibility principle, every public agency should maintain an emergency 
preparedness which is included in their ordinary budget. It is also possible to apply for extra funding 
from the national 2:4 Emergency Preparedness Grant to further strengthen the abilities in emergency 
preparedness (Statskontoret, 2014). Further it is also possible to apply for funding from the national 
2:2 Preventive Measures against Landslides and other Natural Disasters grant 
(Försvarsdepartementet, 2014). 
Sometimes it is difficult to decide what should be funded by the authority or municipality and what is 
included in the 2:4 Emergency Preparedness Grant. The grant can be used to fund projects that are a 
cooperation between actors. The grant could also be used for funding comprehensive, and sometimes 
temporary, risk-reducing measures that are of essential importance for the society (MSB, 2015d). 
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3 Method 
To answer the research question an interview study with twelve respondents was performed. Five 
interviews were held with respondents working in national authorities, five with County 
Administrative Boards and two interviews were not applicable to either category but were still 
regarded to provide valuable input to the study. 
The interviews were semi-structured using open-ended questions with the advantages that probing 
questions can be utilised to develop a deeper understanding of certain subjects. Another advantage is 
that unexpected answers may be given, something that can provide useful input to answer the research 
question. 
A small literature review was conducted in order to sort out relevant literature already written on the 
subject using various combinations of the keywords risk, vulnerability, assessment, management, 
governance, measures, decision maker and Sweden while excluding unrelated keywords such as 
finance and business. The keywords were chosen to suit the research question and the search was 
conducted in the Lund University Libraries databases. The purpose of the literature research was to get 
a broader understanding of the topic in preparation for the interviews. Most of the findings focused 
either on the local and regional level or the contents of the risk and vulnerability assessments and not 
so much on how these assessments actually are utilised for decision making. 
3.1 Selection process 
An e-mail was sent to 26 people in total; 16 people working on a regional level and ten people 
working on a national level. The contacted County Administrative Boards were randomly chosen 
while the national authorities were targeted depending on their perceived relevance to the topic. The 
email contained information about the study with an introduction letter attached, shown in Appendix 
A: Introducing letter. The County Administrative Boards were contacted via e-mail through the 
contact person for the risk and vulnerability assessment given on their webpage. When contacting the 
national authorities four of them were contacted via the contact person given on their webpages and 
four were contacted through a registrar since relevant contact information was not found. With two of 
the national authorities, two persons were contacted. In total twelve potential respondents, including 
registrars, forwarded the question to a more suitable respondent. 
Five potential respondents who got a request for an interview declined with the reasons of not having 
time or that they recently had started to work with the topic and therefore considered themselves to not 
have enough knowledge. Nine persons did not answer the email or forwarded it to another person but 
without any further reply. 
3.2 The respondents 
Twelve interviews were held, five with respondents working in national authorities, five with County 
Administrative Boards and two interviews were not applicable to either category but they operate on 
the national or the regional level. Therefore the twelve respondents are divided into two groups, 
national or regional level. The respondents are listed in Appendix C: Respondents. 
The respondents’ educational background was divided into three groups: Natural/Technical sciences, 
Social sciences and Other. The group other includes people without academic background. Seven 
respondents had an education in the realm of the social sciences, one had a background in 
natural/technical science and four had other backgrounds such as military or emergency services. The 
distribution is shown in figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Educational background of the respondents. The category other includes military or emergency 
services background. The total number of respondents is twelve. 
3.3 Interviews 
In total, twelve interviews were conducted. The duration of the interviews varied between 15 and 45 
minutes. Four interviews were held in person and eight were held using telephone. The interviews held 
in person were longer compared to the ones using telephone and also followed by discussions that 
were outside the interview and therefore not recorded. All interviews were recorded and transcribed in 
order to be available for thorough analysis. 
After the first interviews it was clear that the interviews held in person were more exhaustive. The 
questions were not sent beforehand, except to one respondent who requested it. The aim was to get the 
respondents’ spontaneous thoughts. In three cases the respondents mentioned beforehand that they did 
not have the possibility to spend the requested 30 minutes on the interview or had special knowledge 
that did not fit to the guide but was of interest for the work. These interviews are marked in Appendix 
C: . In these cases the length of the interview guide was adapted accordingly keeping focus on risk and 
vulnerability assessments. 
The questions in the interview guide were open-ended with suggestions on relevant probing questions. 
The questions are ideally short but delivers long answers (Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson, Wängnerud, 
2012, pp. 264-265). The first part aimed to create trust between the interviewer and the respondent and 
covered questions about current work, background and the respondents’ view of risk. The second part 
covered risk and vulnerability assessments and how they are performed within the respondents’ 
organisations. The third part focused on the use of risk and vulnerability assessments in the decision 
making process as well as strengths and weaknesses. The last part covered points of improvement with 
the assessments and their utilisation in the decision making process. The interviews were held in 
Swedish.  
The interview guide was updated after the first two interviews. The order of the questions about the 
respondent’s background and current work changed and a question regarding problems with risk and 
vulnerability assessments was removed since it was answered when asking about weaknesses. A 
translation of the different interview guides is attached in Appendix B: Interview guide. 
A few respondents also sent their risk and vulnerability assessments, working documents with 
instructions and documents from workshops on the topic. These documents were used to increase the 
knowledge about the topic but also as a source of data for the result. 
8%
59%
33%
Educational background of the respondents
Natural/Technical
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Other
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3.4 Analysis 
The interviews were analysed based on the topics of the interview guide and common denominators 
were identified. The question What is risk? was analysed regarding whether it contained the parts of 
the ACU-framework presented in the theoretical background. How the respondents described risk and 
vulnerability assessments was analysed regarding whether they included the parts identification, 
analysis and evaluation. 
The answers on the other questions were used to find common use, opinions and points of 
improvement related to risk and vulnerability assessments. The results from the interviews were used 
to make a description of how risk and vulnerability assessments are utilised both on a regional and a 
national level and the connections between these levels. From this description further analysis of 
strengths, weaknesses and points of improvement mentioned by the respondent were made.  
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4 Result 
The results from the twelve interviews were divided into three parts: 
 The concept of risk 
 Risk and vulnerability assessment as an input for decision making 
 Strengths, weaknesses and points of improvements 
The twelve respondents were put together into two different groups, six professionals working on the 
national level and six professionals working on the regional level. The result is summarised as the 
opinion expressed within the groups to maintain the respondents’ anonymity. 
4.1 The concept of risk 
To better understand the work with risk and vulnerability assessments the respondents were asked 
about their views on the concepts of risk as well as risk and vulnerability assessments. In total, ten 
respondents answered the questions What is risk? and What is a risk and vulnerability assessment?. 
Two of the twelve respondents did not answer these questions since this part was not of priority due to 
limitations in time or specific knowledge of the respondent. 
4.1.1 What is risk? 
The answers to the question What is risk? were analysed regarding whether the respondents included 
the events, consequences and uncertainties related to the ACU-framework. All ten respondents 
included events in their concept, seven included consequences and four included uncertainties. The 
result is summarised in table 2. One national respondent argued that the concept of risk is dependent 
on the context. Another national respondent mentioned that risk is about dependencies to other actors. 
Table 2. The number of respondents including the elements from the ACU-framework in their concept of risk. The 
total number of respondents answering the question was ten. 
Elements of the ACU-framework National level Regional level Total 
A - Events 5 5 10 
C - Consequences 3 4 7 
U - Uncertainties 2 2 4 
Only two of ten respondents, both operating on the national level, referred to known standards and 
regulations when answering this question. One of them referred to the Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency’s regulations MSBFS 2015:3. The regulations state that risk is a combination of the likelihood 
of the event and its consequences (MSBFS 2015:3). The other respondent referred to the ISO 31 000 
standard about Risk management – Principles and Guidelines which express risk as effect of 
uncertainty on objectives (SS-ISO 31000:2009, p. 1).  
When asking the respondents about their view on risk, the answers were often vague and tentative. 
The answer was often more of a discussion with themselves about what risk really is. 
4.1.2 What is a risk and vulnerability assessment? 
The answers to what a risk and vulnerability assessment is for the respondent were analysed regarding 
whether the respondents included identification, analysis and evaluation. All ten respondents included 
identification and analysis in their answers. Five respondents, three national and two regional, 
included evaluation. The result is summarised in table 3. 
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Table 3. The number of respondents including the different elements of a risk and vulnerability assessments from 
the theoretical background in their answers to what a risk and vulnerability assessment is. The total number of 
respondents answering the question was ten. 
Elements of a risk assessment National level Regional level Total 
Identification 5 5 10 
Analysis 5 5 10 
Evaluation 3 2 5 
When asking what a risk and vulnerability assessment is, no respondents mentioned concrete parts 
such as matrices, frequencies or the treatment of uncertainties. This was only mentioned when probing 
questions were asked specifically about the content of a risk and vulnerability assessment. One 
respondent referred to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency regulations when probing about the 
contents of a risk and vulnerability assessment. 
4.2 Risk and vulnerability assessments as an input for decision making 
The following questions were answered by all twelve respondents. The respondents were asked about 
the role of the risk and vulnerability assessment related to decision making. All respondents said that 
risk and vulnerability assessments are used as a support for decision making. Seven of the twelve 
respondents described risk and vulnerability assessments as a part of a more comprehensive process, 
such as including workshops and exercises in their work with risk and vulnerability assessments. Out 
of these seven respondents five operated on the regional level. Two of them said that the risk and 
vulnerability assessment was the ground for planning of exercises and not only used for the planning 
of physical risk-reducing measures. The two national respondents said that the risk and vulnerability 
assessments were used as input for the activity planning. One of them also said that the risk and 
vulnerability assessment is based on the events and incidents during the previous years. The other 
national respondent stated that the risk and vulnerability assessments made at the agency are the basis 
for a to-do-list over risk-reducing measures. 
Four respondents, two national and two regional, mentioned that the risk and vulnerability assessments 
they got were different compared to each other. They saw difficulties to summarise the information 
and also to act on them when they differ as much as they do. Especially the respondents from the 
national level felt frustrated about this since they argued that it is difficult for them to summarise the 
data and therefore also to work out a comprehensive risk and vulnerability assessment. Despite this, 
there was an understanding for the differences in the risk and vulnerability assessments explained by 
the lack of resources and a useful and comprehensible method. The most common opinions about risk 
and vulnerability assessments as input for decision making are shown in table 4. 
Table 4. The number of respondents including the different properties of risk and vulnerability assessments (RVA) 
as input for decision making. The total number of respondents answering the question was twelve. 
Risk and vulnerability assessments as input for 
decision making 
National level Regional level Total 
RVA:s as a support for decision making 6 6 12 
RVA:s as a part of a process 2 5 7 
Differences in the input data 2 2 4 
RVA:s as input for activity planning 2 2 4 
RVA:s are done to apply for funding 1 1 2 
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One national respondent was worried that the same risk and vulnerability assessments are used again 
and again over time with only a few additions or changes. The respondent thought that the reason 
behind this could be a lack of time or other resources for the work. 
One national and one regional respondent said that the risk and vulnerability assessments are done 
with the aim to apply for money. The national respondent also said that there is a lot of politics when 
making decisions, both related to interest but also available financial resources. It was explained by 
saying that there are always competitions about the money and depending on the size of the region, 
geographical location and available money the prerequisites for implementing risk-reducing measures 
are different in different regions. According to the respondent the risk and vulnerability assessments 
could differ in their roles for decision making depending on the resources available in the region or 
municipality. 
4.2.1 Feedback 
No questions were asked explicitly about the degree of communication between the levels but the 
respondents mentioned it related to the question about risk and vulnerability assessments as an input 
for decisions making. In total five interviews treated feedback between the different levels, four with 
national respondents and one with a regional. The respondent from the regional level was positive to 
the idea of more feedback from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency but also expressed an 
understanding about that the workload could be too comprehensive. Two national respondents were 
frustrated about the feedback process and wanted to see improvements. One of them was more focused 
on feedback to lower levels than with the departments. The other two national respondents did not 
request a feedback system, instead they thought that it was more or less solved by the involved 
stakeholders working together with the assessments. 
One of the four respondents from the national level stated that the feedback from the level above is 
very dependent on the official at the authority and that today there are no clear rules about the 
feedback. Two of the five respondents referred to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency national 
risk and vulnerability assessment when being asked about how much feedback they receive. They 
explained that this is also very general feedback and they do not really know how their risk and 
vulnerability assessment is received by the authorities. 
4.2.2 Political commitment 
No questions were asked explicitly about political commitment but two national and one regional 
respondent mentioned it related to the question about risk and vulnerability assessments as an input for 
decisions making. They pointed at the importance of which signal the politicians send. If they for 
example change the grant for risk-reducing measures or the timeframe for risk and vulnerability 
assessment this could be perceived as the work with risk-reducing measures or the risk and 
vulnerability assessments is of more or less importance to the country. This in turn will affect the 
commitment and the resources budgeted at regional and municipal level. During one interview it was 
explained that if there has been a disaster recently the political decisions are of increased importance 
to create commitment to disaster management.  
4.2.3 Funding for risk-reducing measures 
Another reoccurring topic not explicitly asked about during the interviews were the funding of risk-
reducing measures. Three respondents from the regional level and four from the national level 
mentioned different aspects of funding on at least one question during the interview. The respondents 
from the County Administrative Boards said that they apply for extra funding, in different extent, from 
the available grants for risk-reducing measures. The respondents from the national level pointed out 
that the funding for risk-reducing measures should be included in the ordinary budgets. They were 
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worried that risk-reducing measures were not implemented if no extra funding was available. Two 
national respondents who mentioned funding felt very frustrated about how funding from grants was 
used when implementing risk-reducing measures. They meant that the system was not used in the right 
way when risk-reducing measures are dependent on funding from grants. One of the respondents also 
expressed a dissatisfaction regarding the commitment from the national government on the issue.  
A national respondent brought up that the 2:4 Emergency Preparedness grant has been used to 
develop softer projects during the recent years compared to a few years ago when focus was on more 
physical risk-reducing measures. 
One regional respondent mentioned that it is difficult with the funding of risk-reducing measures in 
large organisations. Every administrative unit has to fund the measures within their responsibility, 
which makes it difficult to implement decisions about risk-reducing measures compared to if the 
whole organisation had a unified budget for risk-reducing measures. 
4.2.4 Methods for risk and vulnerability assessments 
Two regional respondents said that they have started a process for improving and changing their work 
with risk and vulnerability assessments. One of them described that they have seen a need for a better 
work with the risk and vulnerability assessments since they are not used in the organisation and are 
just considered as an unused report on a shelf. Therefore they develop a more including process that 
also works as a support for the municipalities to develop comprehensive risk and vulnerability 
assessments. One of the main points in the new method is that the stakeholders in the region together 
should decide what is worth protecting. 
4.3 Strengths, weaknesses and points of improvement 
The respondents were asked about strengths and weaknesses as well as points of improvement with 
the risk and vulnerability assessment as they are used today. When asked about the strengths eight of 
twelve respondents specifically mentioned that they feel that the risk and vulnerability assessments 
motivate measures to reduce risk. Three respondents said that one strength with risk and vulnerability 
assessments is that they are done to get funding. The main strengths that were mentioned are 
summarised in table 5. 
Table 5. The number of respondents mentioned the most common strengths with risk and vulnerability 
assessments as a tool in decision making. The total number of respondents answering the question was twelve. 
Strengths National level Regional level Total 
Motivate measures 4 4 8 
Used to apply for funding 2 1 3 
Three respondents, one national and two regional, said that if the risk and vulnerability assessments 
are comprehensive and elaborate they would give a good picture of the situation and also be a good 
support for decisions. It was also common that the respondents started to talk about weaknesses 
instead of strengths. 
When asking about weaknesses four respondents mentioned that the risk and vulnerability 
assessments in many cases became a shelf item that was not actually utilised in the decision making 
process. Three respondents stated that the connection between the risk and vulnerability assessments 
and the actual risk-reducing measures taken was weak. Three respondents detected a glitch between 
the different levels regarding the degree of knowledge about what is happening with the risk and 
vulnerability assessments on the other levels. One regional respondent thought that there is better 
transparency between the local and the regional level compared to regional to national level where the 
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glitch is much larger. Another regional respondent thought that there are few national authorities that 
know how their national departments processes the assessments sent to them. Three respondents 
mentioned that there are differences in how risk and vulnerability assessments are performed. The 
most common weaknesses are summarised in table 6. 
Table 6. The most common weaknesses mentioned with risk and vulnerability assessments (RVA) as a tool in 
decision making. The total number of respondents answering the question was twelve. 
Weaknesses National level Regional level Total 
RVA only a shelf item 0 4 4 
Weak connection between RVA and risk 
reducing measures 
2 1 3 
Glitch in knowledge regarding what is 
happening with RVA:s on other levels 
2 1 3 
Differences in how the RVA:s are performed 2 1 3 
One national respondent exemplified using a consultant as a weakness. If the case is that the 
consultant performs the assessment and leaves the report there is no increase in knowledge in the 
organisation. Thus, it is not the document that is of most importance, it is the process behind it 
according to the respondent. 
When asking about points of improvement the respondents formed two camps. One camp that 
requested a more general method used when assessing risk consisting of four respondents, two 
national and two regional. One national respondent said that there is a need for more structure and 
rigor to be able to compare the risk and vulnerability assessments. Three respondents, one national and 
two regional, wanted to improve the quality of their risk and vulnerability assessments by clarifying 
the connection between risks, vulnerabilities and measures. The other camp, consisting of one national 
and two regional respondents, preferred the freedom of adapting the methods used to their own 
context. However, all three respondents mentioned the need for clarity in the instructions but argued 
that the solution was not a general method since it would reduce the possibility to adapt to local 
circumstances.  
In relation to a more regulated method two national respondents expressed that the risk and 
vulnerability assessments have to be more quantitative. Another respondents on the national level did 
not see quantification as practicable since it is too much information and a huge workload. 
Another point of improvement was the frequency of performing the risk and vulnerability assessments. 
Four respondents, two national and two regional, explicitly mentioned that a reduced frequency from 
the current annual assessment to semi-annually would increase the quality of the risk and vulnerability 
assessments in national authorities and/or County Administrative Boards. According to all of them this 
would enable the possibilities to implement risk-reducing measures. However two respondents, one 
regional and one national, wanted the municipalities to increase their frequency from once every 
fourth year to semi-annually. 
Two national respondents requested increased possibilities to perform inspections of the work but also 
incentives to perform risk-reducing measures, such as financial benefits. One regional respondent 
pointed out that a weakness with the risk and vulnerability assessment is that it is easy to pay attention 
to high consequence – low likelihood scenarios but there is a need to look beyond these scenarios. The 
respondent also pointed out that the regional risk and vulnerability assessment often treated national 
issues such as energy supply, infrastructure and telecommunication. The respondent said that there are 
obviously factors that affect them but they cannot control it. The respondent would instead prefer that 
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the regional risk and vulnerability assessment should focus more on the risks that distinguishes the 
region from others. 
All through the interviews the respondents working on a regional level did not mention as many 
weaknesses and points of improvements as the respondents on the national level. 
  
 21 
 
5 Discussion 
The aim of this thesis is to describe how risk and vulnerability assessments are utilised in the decision 
making process on the national and regional level in Sweden. This section begins with reflections on 
the results from the interviews and their relation to other research on the topic. Afterwards follows a 
short description of how risk and vulnerability assessments are utilised on the national and regional 
level. Observed gaps within the work with risk and vulnerability assessments will also be identified. 
During an interview study there are possible biases that can affect the result and thereby also the 
analysis of the result. These possible biases will be discussed at the end of this section. 
5.1 Reflections 
Based on the result from the interviews, presented under the heading result, together with input from 
earlier studies performed by others the analysis aims to see hints on development, strengths and 
weaknesses with how risk and vulnerability assessments are utilised in the decision making process for 
disaster management in Sweden. The aim is also to highlight interesting and relevant thoughts from 
the respondents. 
5.1.1 The concept of risk 
Seven of ten respondents answering the question about the concept of risk included consequences in 
their definition. In order to make risk-informed decisions a risk and vulnerability assessment without a 
description of the consequences is not useful for a decision maker. There were only four respondents 
including uncertainty in their definition of risk. This could be seen as a weakness since risk and 
vulnerability assessments often are uncertain because the future cannot be predicted. Describing 
uncertainties could help the decision makers to understand how uncertain the analysis is which in turn 
helps them evaluate and prioritise between different risks. 
It is difficult to come up with one concluding definition of the respondents’ view of the term risk since 
the answers were too vague and straggling. It seems like there is no clear and widespread definition of 
risk in the Swedish disaster management system. There is instead an ambiguity regarding the meaning 
of the term. One reason to this could be that there is no common definition of risk in academia and that 
the concept is difficult to describe. The uncertainties are most likely transferred into the risk and 
vulnerability assessments. It could be difficult to perform a comprehensive risk and vulnerability 
assessment without having a clear understanding of risk.  
However, when asking about what a risk and vulnerability assessment is the respondents were more 
confident in answering the question. The reason to this could be that risk and vulnerability assessment 
is more concrete while defining risk is more abstract and not often done. Even though risk is abstract 
the risk and vulnerability assessment could be improved if the concept of risk is further discussed to be 
better understood. A widely used definition of risk would make the risk and vulnerability assessments 
more homogenous and easier to communicate. The problem with lack of common definitions is also 
identified by Månsson et al. (2015, p. 10) who concludes that this is a known and reoccurring problem 
in the Swedish disaster management system.  
All ten respondents answering the questions about risk and vulnerability assessment included 
identification and analysis of events but only five included evaluation. Risk evaluation is an important 
part for decision making and therefore it is a bit alarming that this is the part of the risk and 
vulnerability assessments least mentioned by the respondents. The reason for not including risk 
evaluation could be that a prerequisite for evaluation is that there are criteria to evaluate against. These 
criteria should include different perspectives such as human, environmental and economic 
consequences. It could be difficult to set up these criteria, which might result in a too big workload. 
However, this result may be biased by respondents including evaluation when talking about analysis. 
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Risk evaluation enables the decision makers to understand the situation and identify areas in need of 
resources. Consequently it is important that the risk evaluation is comprehensive when using the risk 
and vulnerability assessment as a tool in the decision making process.  
5.1.2 Risk and vulnerability assessments as input for decision making 
All twelve respondents agree that risk and vulnerability assessments provide an input for decision 
making. Only six respondents further explained how risk and vulnerability assessments are used as 
input which implies that the connection between risk and vulnerability assessments and decision 
making is unclear. Four of the six respondents said that risk and vulnerability assessments are used to 
include risk-reducing measures in the organisation’s activity planning. The two other respondents said 
that the assessments are used to apply for funding which implies some sort of activity planning. 
It is seen as positive that all the twelve respondents mentioned risk and vulnerability assessment as a 
tool for decision making since one of the purposes with a risk and vulnerability assessments is to 
communicate the situation and provide decision support. The interview study was presented as a study 
of how risk and vulnerability assessments are utilised for decision making. Therefore the respondents 
could be biased from the topic of the interviews. Only seven of twelve respondents mentioned risk and 
vulnerability assessments as a part of a process, which is a bit more alarming. If the risk and 
vulnerability assessments are not seen as a process it is easy that the organisations are satisfied with 
just writing them and then putting them on a shelf instead of implementing them in the work with risk-
reducing measures and as a support for decision making. This together with one respondent’s worry 
regarding that the same risk and vulnerability assessments are reused year after year with a few 
additions could point at them being seen more as a mandatory report than as a process to increase 
preparedness within the whole of society. Maybe is there a change going on regarding this, at least at 
the regional level. Five of these seven respondents operated on a regional level. Two of them 
explained that they have started the work with improving the work with risk and vulnerability 
assessments towards a more holistic, including and comprehensive process. 
Risk and vulnerability assessments do not reach their full potential if they are not seen as a process. 
The risks and the vulnerabilities in a society are dynamic and change with both external forces as for 
example climate change or by the political situation in the surrounding world but also with 
implemented risk-reducing measures and changes in organisations. The need of a process could be 
related to Becker (2014) and his thoughts about a resilient society. He states that a resilient society is 
dependent on the ability to anticipate, recognise, adapt and learn (p. 154). These abilities require a 
process and are thereby not fulfilled with just a report on a shelf. Utilising risk and vulnerability 
assessments as a process is important to continuously develop along our preferred expected trajectory 
since it helps anticipating future deviances from what society values. 
Worth mentioning is also the thoughts about the differences in the data that the risk assessors work 
with. This is concluded through input from four respondents who clearly said that there are differences 
as well as a general frustration among the respondents regarding the current use of the received data. 
Even though they were frustrated they were also understanding why there were differences. The 
reason mentioned was lack of resources. It felt like lack of resources was an acceptable reason to why 
the system has inadequacies. As one respondent said, there is always a competition about resources 
and the public sector will never have enough financial resources. A reflection regarding this is that it is 
easy to blame an inadequate system on lack of resources even though there are other reasons for this 
inadequacy. 
Another reason to the differences in the data could be that the risk assessors perform the analyses 
without contemplating the purpose of the assessments within the Swedish disaster management 
system. In an organisation it is easy to perform activities without basing them on objectives. One way 
to avoid this kind of problem is to increase the communication about why the assessments are made 
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and what goals they are purposed to fulfil. The communication should take place between the risk 
assessors on the same level as well as with the levels above and below in the system. It is easier to 
communicate the objectives of an assessment when having a deeper understanding of the system as a 
whole which makes the communication with the level above quite important. This type of 
communication should be initiated from the higher level since it ought to be easier to see the need for 
it when having a broader picture of the system and the roles of each function within it. 
One respondent from the national level said that the work to come up with a risk and vulnerability 
assessment is so comprehensive in time that there is no energy left over for implementing the risk-
reducing measures. Further, according to the respondent, the reason why the risk-reducing measures 
are not implemented could also depend on the funding - a risk and vulnerability assessment is cheaper 
than an actual measure. One of the main points with risk and vulnerability assessments is that they are 
used to identify and motivate risk-reducing measures. If there are no resources left to implement them 
there is a problem. Seven of ten respondents talking about what a risk and vulnerability assessment is 
mentioned that risk-reducing measures are a part of the assessment. To which extent is unknown. It is 
not a guarantee that there is a connection between the identified risk-reducing measures and the 
implementation of them. One consequence of this could be that it is difficult to see the relation 
between the assessments and the commitment of the organisation to reduce risk. Implementing 
measures is a pillar of disaster management and if the assessments do not include risk-reducing 
measures there is a possibility that no measures are implemented. 
5.1.3 Strengths and weaknesses with risk and vulnerability assessments 
One interesting point about the result from the interviews is how the respondents answered the 
question about strengths with risk and vulnerability assessment as input in the decision making 
process. Less strengths were mentioned compared to weaknesses and when talking about strengths 
some of the respondents added an if when talking about how the risk and vulnerability assessments 
could be used and if they were used that way, it would be a strength. This could be interpreted as the 
respondents knowing that there is more potential in the tool. When asking about weaknesses most 
respondents answered the question with less hesitation compared to the question about strengths. One 
explanation to this could be that it is more common that people see the problems or the weaknesses 
easier than the advantages. The question about why they do not use the risk and vulnerability 
assessment as they explain with the added if remains. Is it the lack of resources, commitment or is it 
the Swedish disaster management system that prevents an optimal use? 
Since there is an expressed frustration it is not surprising that they see weaknesses in the method. The 
weaknesses are not seen as the core problem with the system, instead they can be seen as symptoms. 
For example, the differences in the material sent to the authorities is a commonly mentioned 
weakness. The core problem could probably relate to the method used or the principles of the Swedish 
disaster management system regarding how to work with the risk and vulnerability assessments but the 
problem could be shown via differences in the quality of the risk and vulnerability assessments.  
An interesting observation is that the most common strength, mentioned by eight respondents, is that 
risk and vulnerability assessments are used to motivate risk-reducing measures. In contrast to this, one 
reoccurring weakness mentioned by three respondents is that there is a weak connection between the 
risk and vulnerability assessment and the risk-reducing measures. Two of these three respondents 
belong to the respondents who said that a strength with risk and vulnerability assessments is that they 
are used to motivate risk-reducing measures. Worth to keep in mind in this contradiction is the last 
heading that should be included in the risk and vulnerability assessments according to the regulation 
from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency: Required additional measures on the occasion of the 
results from the assessment (MSBFS 2015:3; MSBFS 2015:5). The conclusion of this contradiction is 
that the use of risk and vulnerability assessments to motivate risk-reducing measures differs a lot as 
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they are used today but also that the regulation from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency is not 
converted fully into the work with the assessments and the risk-reducing measures. Even if this is a 
new regulation for 2015, the same heading can also be found in the earlier regulation (MSBFS 
2010:7). 
Another weakness is the glitch in knowledge of what happens with the risk and vulnerability 
assessments at other levels. When asking about the process the respondents often explained the 
process below them, such as from whom they received the data and how they summarised them. Then 
the majority of the respondents just said one or two sentences about to whom they send their risk and 
vulnerability assessment but nothing about how they were processed at the next level. During three 
interviews with national respondents probing questions were asked about if they wanted to know more 
about what happened on the next level. The answers were a bit struggling resulting in that there was 
no further interest in how their risk and vulnerability assessments were received and further analysed. 
This is also related to the thoughts from the respondents about feedback and that there are no general 
guidelines for feedback today. One explanation to this related to decision making is the three 
principles in crises management in Sweden and the bottom-up approach. The work should take place 
where the crisis occurs and should be performed by the people that are closest concerned with as small 
changes in the organisation as possible. According to the principles the risk-reducing measures should 
be implemented at the local level by the stakeholders on this level. The work on the governmental 
level is more about laws, regulations and budget. The cause-effect relation could be easier to see at the 
local and regional level. The decisions that are made on the national political level do not receive the 
same commitment and are often the effect of many contributing causes. Another explanation could be 
that the risk assessors work with the material sent from the level below them and are therefore more 
concerned about it since it is the foundation that enables them to do a good work. 
The question that could arise from the lack of knowledge in how the risk and vulnerability assessments 
are used at the next level is if there is a need of increased feedback and transparency between the 
different levels. One profit with increased transparency is that it could be easier to see dependencies 
and if many regions or organisations face the same problems. If that is the case, there is a need for 
decisions regarding national or political measures. To be able to make these decisions, the information 
must reach the decision makers. To increase the transparency there is a need for feedback of what is 
important to include but maybe also changes in methods, regulations and directives. 
The result from the interviews also point at the regional level being more satisfied with the process 
compared to the national level. On the regional level more respondents referred to risk and 
vulnerability assessments as a process compared to the national level. It was also more respondents 
who expressed a frustration about the topic disaster management on the national level compared to the 
regional level. The reason could be that work with risk and vulnerability assessments is less developed 
on the national level compared to the local and regional level. It could also depend on that the national 
level receive data from two lower levels compared to the regional level who work with data from the 
level directly below them. Transparency could be lost at the levels below and consequently make the 
work more difficult at the national level. 
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5.1.4 Points of improvement 
The points of improvement mentioned during the interviews are difficult to draw general conclusions 
from. They are dependent on personal preferences and the respondents’ backgrounds. The most 
commonly mentioned points of improvement will be analysed below.  
Clarifying the connections between risk and vulnerability assessments and the risk-
reducing measures 
Clarifying the connection between risk and vulnerability assessments and the risk reducing measures 
is a recurring improvement mentioned during all parts of the interviews. The judgement is that it is 
possible to create an improvement regarding this since these connections are one of the main points 
with the risk and vulnerability assessment process. How the improvement should be implemented and 
how the situation is today needs further research to answer.  
Månsson et al. (2015) conclude that today there are insufficient directives, dissimilar in prerequisites, 
mixed purposed and lack of time to provide feedback in the disaster management system. This makes 
the professionals working with the risk and vulnerability assessments frustrated and leads to decreased 
willingness to use the available data presented by others. They mean that all this could affect the 
ability to do a comprehensive work with the risk and vulnerability assessments including the 
implementation of risk-reducing measures (p. 12). These conclusions together with the result from the 
interviews within this thesis indicate that the vague connections between the assessments and the 
measures could be explained by the regulations and directives used today. Related to the result from 
the interviews in this study it seems like the funding and the ownership of the measures also is an 
interference to implementation of risk-reducing measures. The lack of resources and the dependency 
on extra funding for risk-reducing measures should therefore also be seen as something that should be 
further analysed. 
More quantitative data in the risk and vulnerability assessments 
One point of improvement expressed by two respondents on the national level is that the risk and 
vulnerability assessments have to be more quantitative. Another respondent ont the national level did 
not see quantification as practicable since it is too much information and a huge workload. The idea of 
more quantitative data could contribute to increased transparency. On the other side respondents 
already express that the workload with the annual risk and vulnerability assessments is too big. The 
discussion on whether risks should be quantified or not is a recurring discussion, which could be 
related to the different approaches to risk presented in the theoretical background.  
Quantitative likelihoods and uncertainties were seldom mentioned during the interviews. More 
quantitative risk and vulnerability assessments could help the decision makers to better prioritise 
which measures to implement and also to motivate risk-reducing measures. Worth mentioning in this 
context is that people in general, including decision makers, have problems to understand small 
likelihoods and frequencies. Kahneman (2012) states that people overestimate the probabilities of 
unlikely events and therefore people overweight unlikely events in their decisions (p. 324). Disasters 
are often unlikely events and thereby people ought to be overestimating their likelihood. Even if the 
risk and vulnerability assessments are quantitative it is difficult for the decision makers to judge the 
information but an overestimation of the likelihood is better than no likelihood at all. Many 
respondents in this thesis do not have a background in the technical sciences which can affect their 
view on quantification compared to if a technical science background had dominated among the 
respondents.  
Abrahamsson and Tehler (2013) have evaluated risk and vulnerability assessments from County 
Administrative Boards in Sweden from 2008 and 2010. They conclude that the risk and vulnerability 
assessments do not fulfil what is needed as input to the national risk and vulnerability assessment.  
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To achieve their purpose they need to provide more information about scenarios, likelihoods and 
consequences. They also conclude that the risk and vulnerability assessments from 2008 and 2010 
present risk in a qualitative or semi-quantitative manner with the majority of the assessments being 
qualitative (pp. 88-90). This conclusion confirms the lack of quantitative risk and vulnerability 
assessments in this area. 
A more regulated method 
All municipalities and counties face their own risks. There is a need for everyone to be able to adapt 
the method to their own conditions. The more regulated method, the more likely it is that it could be 
difficult to apply to all concerned organisations. One regional respondent expressed a worry that a 
more regulated method is often better customised to the big regions compared to the small. A more 
regulated method could also limit the possibility to think outside the box of what can happen. On the 
other hand a regulated method could increase the comparability between the assessments since they 
will be more homogenous.  
The decision makers are represented on all levels in the society due to the three principles of the crisis 
management system in Sweden. Decisions about risk-reducing measures are made on all levels, from 
the municipalities to the government. Therefore the knowledge from the risk and vulnerability 
assessments need to be spread to all levels but there is also a demand of a limitation in how much 
information that could be spread. The decision makers and risk assessors have limitations in how 
much time they can spend on the assessments. As one national respondent pointed out during the 
interviews: the politicians on the local level do not have time to utilise all the information available as 
it is now. 
Change how often the risk and vulnerability assessments are performed 
Another recurring idea of improvement is that the risk and vulnerability assessments should be 
performed more seldom. This would give more time to implement the measures and also that more 
time could be spent on the process instead of annually producing a report. The idea seems feasible but 
it could include some challenges. The disadvantages with it could be political. An increased time 
interval could send signals that the work with disaster management is of lower priority. Therefore it is 
important to create an understanding that the risk and vulnerability assessments are a part of a more 
comprehensive work and also that the change would enable strengthened disaster management in 
Sweden. The advantages with it related to decision making are that the analyses are more 
comprehensive and also easier to base decisions on. If the link to implemented measures increase it 
will be easier for the decision makers to see how their decisions and priorities changed the risks and 
vulnerabilities. 
Even if disaster management in Sweden is not the topic of most interest to the population there is still 
politics in it. As stated in the result, it is important which signals the politicians send. If Sweden face a 
disaster the commitment from the population will increase and it is thereby important to make the right 
political decisions. The politics about the disaster management is related to the risk perception of 
people. If we have recently faced a disaster it is easier to spend money on risk-reducing measures for 
this disaster compared to new threats. People are biased by what they have experienced recently which 
is known as availability bias. Also, the more concrete the disaster is for our senses, the easier is it for 
people to react on it (Becker, 2014, pp. 165-166). 
The fact regarding how we are affected by what happened recently is described by Alexander (2015). 
He refers to theories about windows of opportunity. A disaster could be seen as window of opportunity 
for positive change. He explains that after a disaster the public will strongly support efforts to reduce 
risk (p. 222). One problem with this is that the world is changing and the future is no longer an 
extrapolation of what has happened. We will miss or ignore scenarios if we base our actions on recent 
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experiences only (Becker, 2014, p. 166). An interesting thing is that the window of opportunity does 
not always generate the requested measures. One example of this mentioned by several respondents 
was the forest fire in Västmanland in august 2014. Before the fire there was ongoing work to increase 
the time interval for the risk and vulnerability assessments for the County Administrative Boards and 
the national authorities. The forest fire did not result in the expected changes about the time interval, 
rather the opposite since no one wanted to make decisions about an increased time interval after the 
event because of political reasons. On the other hand the forest fire generated other positive aspects 
such as discussions about the preparedness in Sweden, the role of the risk and vulnerability 
assessments and the three principles in Swedish crisis management. 
Alexander (2015) pinpoint another relevant thought about disaster risk reduction and politics. He 
states that people do not often see disaster risk reduction as a popular option and politics is about what 
people want (p. 225). One consequence of this related to the research question and the result is that 
there is not enough commitment to the topic. However, perhaps there will soon be a change in the 
time-interval for the national authorities. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agencies request to reduce 
the time interval to every second year for national authorities but that requires a change in 9§ SFS 
2006:942: The Regulation of Emergency Preparedness and Increased Preparedness. This change has 
to be done by the government (MSB, 2015e). 
Create increased possibilities to follow-ups 
This could be related to the discussion about a more regulated method. The disaster management in 
Sweden relies on a bottom-up approach. This could make it difficult to use a more top-down oriented 
approach. There is currently a discussion going on within the Swedish disaster management system to 
increase the possibilities of top-down management in crises situations. 
5.2 The use of risk and vulnerability assessments in the decision making 
process 
To be able to answer the research question it is of importance to find out where the decisions are made 
and by whom. No clear distinction between risk assessors and decision makers has been found within 
the scope of this thesis. Therefore it has been difficult to describe how risk and vulnerability 
assessments are utilised as input for decision making. The difficulties in finding respondents with a 
clear decision making mandate brings out the question whether it is even clear to the professionals 
working within the Swedish disaster management system by whom the decisions are made. This in 
turn can be connected to the previous reasoning about not seeing the purpose of the risk and 
vulnerability assessment. If it is uncertain who are going to use the assessment as decision support it is 
difficult to know how to communicate it and from where to expect feedback on the results. 
A summary of the process on the regional and national level is made from the findings from the twelve 
interviews together with working documents received from the respondents as well as information in 
the theoretical background is presented in the following sections. 
5.2.1 Risk and vulnerability assessments at the regional level 
The County Administrative Boards in Sweden, which have been representing the regional level of the 
Swedish disaster management system in this study, use their risk and vulnerability assessments in 
different ways when it comes to reducing disaster risk. Some boards use them in order to apply for 
funding while others use them as an input to their activity plans. In general risk and vulnerability is 
approached in a qualitative manner by the respondents. The assessment is conceived through various 
activities such as workshops with municipalities and other important stakeholders on the regional level 
as well as utilising risk and vulnerability assessments from the municipalities, County Councils and 
other national authorities. 
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The County Administrative Boards’ risk and vulnerability assessments are presented to, and signed off 
by, the head of the County Administrative Board and is sent to the Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency and to the Government Offices. How the risk and vulnerability assessment is utilised within 
each County Administrative Board after it has been signed off differs. Four of five respondents 
working on a County Administrative Board use it as input when planning exercises and seminars on 
crisis management but how it is utilised by other parts of the organisation is unclear. 
The mandate to perform risk-reducing activities lies on several different stakeholders where the 
principles of proximity and responsibility places many mitigating measures within the mandate of the 
municipalities. This, together with the difficulties in motivating expensive activities with an unclear 
effect, makes it hard to connect performed risk-reducing activities to the risk and vulnerability 
assessment. Thereby the documents become a general description of the risks and vulnerabilities 
present in the county and are not used to their full potential as a tool for decision making. 
When looking at funding of risk-reducing activities there are some differences between the County 
Administrative Boards. One reoccurring answer, mentioned by three of five respondents from the 
County Administrative Boards, was that the boards were in one way or another depending on grants 
from the government to develop their disaster management capabilities by performing risk-reducing 
activities. One respondent even stated that about half of the County Administrative Boards disaster 
preparedness was funded by the 2:4 Emergency Preparedness Grant. A conclusion from the 
interviews is that the risk and vulnerability assessments are important to support decisions about extra 
funding. 
Five of six regional respondents said that the risk and vulnerability assessment are a part of a process. 
The question is how comprehensive the process is since four regional respondent also said that one 
weakness with risk and vulnerability assessments is that it becomes a shelf item. The risk and 
vulnerability assessment does maintain the capability to spread knowledge and information to relevant 
stakeholders but becomes more of a reactive document where the identified events are based on past 
events to anticipate future deviances. This is not optimal since the future cannot be anticipated based 
on past experiences alone. 
One respondent said that the risk and vulnerability assessment is not the only way of identifying 
potential risk-reducing activities, which of course is true. However, these other ways of identifying 
vulnerabilities and risk-reducing activities such as workshops or lessons identified from exercises 
ought to be an input to the risk and vulnerability assessment. Therefore they should be included in the 
document with the aim to present a representative view of the situation to the decision makers. 
Two of five respondents from County Administrative Boards said that their boards have started to 
work with improving the way they perform risk and vulnerability assessments. There are ongoing 
changes towards a more holistic and collaborative way of working with risk and vulnerability within 
the counties. This seems positive for the decision makers since the holistic perspective is important to 
make risk-informed and relevant decisions. 
5.2.2 Risk and vulnerability assessments at the national level 
Two of six national respondents said that the risk and vulnerability assessments sent to the authorities 
from a lower level differ a lot in their extent and quality. This makes it difficult to aggregate them and 
to make decisions based on them. Despite this, all the authorities represented in this study experience 
that the risk and vulnerability assessments are appreciated in the decision making process. The 
differences in the data makes it difficult for the national authorities to use their own methods because 
it is not known how the data has been treated when the analyses are done. There is no stringency in 
methods used. All national authorities have to follow the guidelines from the Swedish Civil 
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Contingencies Agency but there are no regulations on which method to use. The differences in 
methods create difficulties in making comparisons and observing trends over time.  
According to two of six national respondents the risk and vulnerability assessments are used as a 
support for the upcoming activity planning by the authorities. Often the events from the recent years 
are used as input in the risk and vulnerability assessments. Overall the risk and vulnerability 
assessments performed by the interviewed organisations are qualitative in their data. Since the sectors 
often are big the risk and vulnerability assessments are also general which could make them difficult 
to act on. It is important to keep in mind that even though these difficulties exist, the risk and 
vulnerability assessments are an appreciated tool for decision making since they generate a knowledge 
to make decisions from even if they do not fulfil their potential. 
Today the risk and vulnerability assessments have deficient links between the risks and the proposed 
measures according to two national respondents. This is a problem even though the regulations from 
the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency says that the national authorities should analyse the need for 
additional measures on the occasion of the results from the assessment (MSBFS 2015:3). There are 
also identified inadequacies regarding the report of the actions taken from the last risk and 
vulnerability assessment, which could have changed the organisations capacity. One respondent said 
that often, not all implemented risk-reducing measures are reported which makes the national 
authorities insecure about if and to what extent risk-reducing measures are implemented and also 
which decisions are made. 
The implementation of measures is strongly related to the funding. Related to the responsibility 
principle every agency should fund their own risk-reducing measures if it is not a special occasion. 
Respondents from the national level felt confident in the knowledge that they should fund most risk-
reducing measures from their own budget but three national respondents felt worried that the 
implementation of measures is defective at the regional and local level if they do not get funding from 
the grants. The risk and vulnerability assessments are of great importance when talking about 
decisions regarding funding. 
One common observation among the national respondents is that the national authorities focus more 
on the processes at the levels below them compared to what happens at the political level at the 
departments. All national respondents could better explain the process below them compared to the 
process at the Government Office. The process at the Government Office is understood from 
interviews together with working documents. The departments are more interested in problems with 
the national disaster management system and the interlinked regulations than the actual risks and 
vulnerabilities. If there are identified inadequacies it is the government’s responsibility to manage 
these with tools as proposals of changes in laws and regulations or in the appropriation warrant. The 
role of risk and vulnerability assessments at governmental level is not entirely compliant to the 
purpose of the assessment on the regional or even national level. 
The working process with the risk and vulnerability assessments differs a bit between the different 
departments since there are different needs. Some departments have the responsibility for national 
authorities that often are included in serious events and some departments are involved more rarely. 
Therefore there is no method used at all departments. Instead there are recommendations of general 
process that should be used at all departments.  
The Department of Justice sends feedback to the departments which in turn send feedback to their 
national authorities. There is no general method for giving feedback. Instead it depends on the officials 
at the departments what feedback they want to give. This could create differences in how much and 
which sort of feedback every authority has access to. There is no personal feedback from the Swedish 
Civil Contingencies Agency to the other national authorities. Instead the national authorities refer to 
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the national risk and vulnerability assessment. Even if there are not much feedback there is no 
perceived request of it from the respondents within the national authorities. 
5.3 Observed gaps 
When observing how risk and vulnerability assessments are utilised as support for decisions some 
areas where there is room for improvement have been recognised, both related to the work with risk 
and vulnerability assessments but also to the communication between the regional and national level.  
The documents from the risk and vulnerability assessments have a tendency to become separated from 
the risk management process. This result in that the risk and vulnerability assessments become a shelf 
item and do not fulfil their potential. The problem is related to the difficulties in connecting the risk 
and vulnerability assessments to risk-reducing activities and the implementation of risk-reducing 
measures. 
An observed difference between the regional and national level related to the implementation of risk-
reducing measures is the view on how to use grants to finance disaster management. On the regional 
level it is seen as a necessity to maintain reasonable disaster preparedness while the national 
authorities seemed to see them as a complimentary tool to their ordinary budget. 
Another gap identified is that there is not enough focus on the risk evaluation in the risk and 
vulnerability assessment. Risk evaluation is an important part in the decision making process but it is 
also difficult to do a comprehensive risk evaluation. The evaluation is related to the risk-reducing 
measures since one approach is to evaluate against the effect of risk-reducing measures. 
The view on communication of the risk and vulnerability assessments and the need for feedback 
between the levels differ. There seems to be less interest in how the risk and vulnerability assessments 
are used after they have been passed on to the level above compared to what is produced on the level 
below. The need for feedback is recognised at both the regional and national level to clarify the effect 
of the risk and vulnerability assessments. 
5.4 Possible biases 
Performing research implies including some biases related both to the method and the respondents. It 
is important to keep these biases in mind when analysing the results and drawing conclusions from the 
work. Even though there are identified possible biases in the result and the sample is small, the thesis 
is considered to provide an analytical generalisation (Yin, 2003, p.10) of how risk and vulnerability 
assessments are utilised in the decision making process in the Swedish disaster management system. 
5.4.1 Method 
A bias of the thesis is the inexperience of the authors when it comes to performing interviews. 
Interviewing is an art and claiming to perform quality interviews without having the experience would 
be unwise. The learning curve of performing interviews has been quite fast and therefore the last 
interviews held were better performed than the first ones. In order to be able to ask relevant probing 
question and discuss the topic during the interviews a small literature review was performed. The aim 
was not to get a complete picture. To improve the quality of the thesis a more structured and complete 
literature review could have been performed. Since the purpose of the thesis is to perform a descriptive 
study based on interviews the extent of the literature study is not regarded to have had a large impact 
on the result. 
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The interview guide used worked fairly well and the questions used often provided long answers from 
the respondents. The responses were mostly on-topic. A weakness concerning the interview guide is 
that it was not possible to use it with all respondents due to time restraints or a need to focus the 
questions in a certain interview to the respondents work. This was done in three interviews and while 
they did not answer all the questions from the guide, they all provided information that was useful to 
answer the research question. 
Eight of twelve interviews were held using telephone. These interviews tended to be shorter and 
provide less elaborate answers than the interviews held in person, which was expected since it is 
possible to develop a more trustful relationship in person than over telephone. This provides a 
possibility of affecting the result since the interviews held in person provided more personal opinions 
and more elaborate answers. However, since only four of twelve interviews were held in person, this is 
regarded to have a low impact on the result and since the more information gained is better the 
interviews held in person should be seen as advantages of the thesis instead of weaknesses. 
The analysis of the interviews comes with several biases. The definition of risk adopted in this thesis 
together with the authors’ backgrounds in engineering places focus on quantification and 
concretisation of risk which might result in less notice being taken of other approaches to risk. When 
compiling the results the points chosen to place focus on are not the only ones made in the interviews 
which implies a certain selection must have been made. This selection was based on the points 
mentioned by most respondents and the relevance of these points to decision making and risk and 
vulnerability assessments. Since there were no respondents showing any extreme views on the concept 
of risk and the use of risk and vulnerability assessments the screening process is considered to be 
objective in regard to what points to focus on. 
The results have been compiled simultaneously with the interviews, which may have affected the 
outcome of them. The results from previous interviews has opened up for probing questions in 
following interviews. Since semi-structured interviews were used, this has not been considered an 
issue but an opportunity to increase the detail and depth achieved in the interviews. One problem this 
may have caused is to introduce leading questions into the interviews when trying to pinpoint certain 
problems. This was observed, especially in the early stages of interviewing, but is not considered to 
have affected the respondents’ answers in any major way. 
When compiling and analysing the results it was difficult to draw conclusions from what was not 
mentioned in the interviews. On the other hand, the responses from the interviews show what comes to 
the respondents mind at the time which might imply whether one area of inquiry is more considered or 
not. Determining this is one of the hardest parts of compiling the results and creates a weakness in the 
result. 
Another bias related to the analysis of the interviews is that the respondents could have used different 
notions for describing the concept of risk while meaning the same thing. This could have affected the 
result regarding how many respondents included the different parts of the concept of risk in their 
answers. 
When performing interviews with open-ended question it is important to keep in mind that the 
interviews will focus on different perspectives of the topic. Every respondent will talk about that they 
know and what they are interested in. This makes it difficult to quantify the result since all interviews 
do not include the same data. Compared to if a questionnaire had been used the data had been more 
quantifiable but it would also omit interesting thoughts and opinions that the questions do not cover. 
Since this study is descriptive, getting the thoughts and opinions about the system was valued higher 
than a quantifiable result. 
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The result could also be biased by which opinions are presented from the interviews. There is no 
possibility to present everything mentioned during the interviews. The aim has been to present the 
most common views of how risk and vulnerability assessments are used for decision making. Some 
opinions mentioned by only one respondent have also been presented since they have been determined 
as interesting to the result. If someone else has worked with the same interviews it is possible that they 
would have highlighted other things. Once again, since there are no general conclusions drawn from 
the specific interviews this is not seen as weakness with the thesis. 
5.4.2 Respondents 
There is a possibility that the respondents interviewed represent a small part of the desired population 
that has an interest in participating in studies such as this one and that this may have resulted in that 
only the views of one demographic within the researched population is represented in the result. Not 
all national authorities or County Administrative Boards working with risk and vulnerability 
assessments were contacted due to limitations in time. The national authorities were mainly contacted 
through registrars and depending on whom the request was forwarded to the resulting interview ought 
to have yielded different results. However, the respondents were able to provide answers to most of 
the questions and should be considered a representative sample of the professionals involved in 
disaster management in Sweden today. They cover a variety of backgrounds and are distributed 
between young professionals and professionals with extensive experience in the field. 
The differences in experience clearly showed when it came to the interviews. More experienced 
respondents were inclined to provide personal views and clear answers to the questions while more 
inexperienced respondents tended to be unclear in their answers and not as open with their personal 
opinions. 
The research process did not consider the geographical distribution of the respondents, which could 
have impacted the result by focusing it to a certain part of Sweden. The most geographically sensitive 
group of respondents is the County Administrative Boards and the interviews turned out to cover 
central and southern Sweden. There were no respondents from northern Sweden. This was not 
considered beforehand and might provide a bias but is not believed to have impacted the study in any 
important manner. 
The sample is not very large. This is a result of the timeframe of the thesis. The conclusions drawn 
from the interviews can therefore not be regarded as a complete image of the Swedish disaster 
management system. Yet it is considered to be large enough to provide an analytical generalisation 
(Yin, 2003, p.10) of the question at hand. The interviews have provided a fairly good theoretical 
saturation, which means that the last interviews did not change the general result. Instead the last 
interviews strengthened the already identified areas of inquiry. 
5.5 Areas of interest for further research 
To gain a better understanding of how risk and vulnerability assessments are utilised in the decision 
making process a study of how identified risk-reducing measures are implemented today is of interest. 
What has been included in the risk and vulnerability assessment that motivate implementation? How 
many of the identified risk-reducing measures are implemented and how are they funded? How 
dependent are the risk-reducing measures on extra funding? 
Another area of further interest is how the politicians on all levels experience the material they receive 
from the risk and vulnerability assessments and how important the material is compared to other 
inputs when making decisions. 
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6 Conclusions 
Risk and vulnerability assessments are an important part of the Swedish disaster management system. 
They are supposed to be used as a first step in the process of reducing risk and vulnerability in society 
as well as to increase the ability to mitigate the effects of, and respond to, extraordinary events (MSB 
2011, pp. 5-6). The assessments can be used as a tool to support decision makers when making 
decisions regarding disaster management. Earlier research has mainly been done regarding the use of 
risk and vulnerability assessments on the local and regional level in Sweden, as can be seen in for 
example Hassel (2012), Abrahamsson and Tehler (2013) and Lin, Nilsson, Sjölin, Abrahamsson and 
Tehler (2015). Today there is a limited knowledge regarding how risk and vulnerability assessments 
are utilised as an input to decision making on the regional and national levels in Sweden as well as 
how they are perceived. 
The purpose of this thesis has been to perform a descriptive study of how risk and vulnerability 
assessments are utilised as input to decision making in the field of disaster management at the regional 
and national level in Sweden. To fulfil this purpose an interview study consisting of twelve semi-
structured interviews, six with respondents operating on a national level and six operating on the 
regional level of the Swedish disaster management system, was performed.  
Decisions regarding risk-reducing measures are made on all levels in Sweden, by administrators and 
politicians from local to national level depending on the extent of the decision. The Swedish disaster 
management system relies on a bottom-up approach, which entails that decisions about risk-reducing 
measures are mainly made on the level closest to the risk. To be able to answer the research question it 
is of importance to find out where the decisions are made and by whom. No clear distinction between 
risk assessors and decision makers has been found within the scope of this thesis. Therefore it has been 
difficult to describe how risk and vulnerability assessments are utilised as input for decision making. 
The difficulties in finding respondents with a clear decision making mandate brings out the question 
whether it is even clear to the professionals working within the Swedish disaster management system 
by whom the decisions are made.  
Based on the twelve interviews the following conclusions can be drawn regarding how risk and 
vulnerability assessments are utilised in the decision making process for disaster management at the 
national and regional levels in Sweden: 
 Risk and vulnerability assessments are appreciated as a tool for decision support. 
 There is a weak connection between the risk and vulnerability assessments and risk reducing 
measures since it is unclear how suggested measures are implemented and followed-up on. 
 The greatest strength with risk and vulnerability assessments today is that they are used to 
motivate risk-reducing measures. 
 There is a deeper frustration about the process with risk and vulnerability assessments on the 
national level compared to the regional level. This is based on emotions perceived and 
identified weaknesses during the interviews. 
 Risk evaluation is not considered to be an obvious part of a risk and vulnerability assessment 
since it is only mentioned by half of the respondents when asked about the content of a risk 
and vulnerability assessment.  
 There is an ambiguity among the professionals in the field on the concept of risk which could 
affect the quality of the risk and vulnerability assessments. 
Based on the findings from the interviews the work with risk and vulnerability assessments in the 
Swedish disaster management system can be improved. A more developed process with risk and 
vulnerability assessments will positively impact the Swedish society’s ability to anticipate and adapt to 
the uncertainty of the future, recognise deviances and learn from past and anticipated events and 
thereby help creating a more resilient society. 
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In order to utilise the full potential of the Swedish disaster management system it is important that 
there is efficient and effective communication between all levels: local, regional and national. Today 
the system relies on a bottom-up approach, which makes it difficult to change the situation by using 
laws and regulations. Instead, there has to be a change towards a more centralised system or an 
increased ownership of the question from the lower levels and upwards. It is difficult to develop a 
system suitable to all levels of the Swedish disaster management system. The aim with this thesis is 
not to come up with general solutions. Instead the findings should be seen as an analytical 
generalisation of what the situation looks like today. Some recommendations on future development 
are made based on the result from the twelve interviews. 
First, this thesis agree with the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agencies that the national authorities and 
County Administrative Boards should perform risk and vulnerability assessments every second year 
instead of yearly since this would enable increased possibilities to implement as well as to follow up 
risk-reducing measures.  
In addition to this, risk evaluation needs to be given more attention since this is an important input for 
decision making. One way to do this is to work more with developing measurable criteria for 
evaluation. Every authority should develop their own criteria in order to be able to adapt them to their 
own context. 
There needs to be increased communication between the regional, national and political levels to get a 
better understanding of how the risk and vulnerability assessments are used on other levels and also to 
get input regarding whether the assessments are useful. The initiative to this should be taken by the 
national authorities. 
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Appendix A: Introducing letter 
The following letter was attached in the first contact with the potential respondents. 
Examensarbete om hur riskanalyser används vid beslutsfattande 
Vi är två studenter som läser till civilingenjörer inom riskhantering vid Lunds Tekniska Högskola. Vi 
genomför nu vårt examensarbete som handlar om hur riskanalyser används inom 
katastrofriskreducering, både nationellt och internationellt. Arbetet syftar till att undersöka hur 
riskanalyser används som stöd i beslutsprocessen inom katastrofriskreducering. För att undersöka detta 
genomför vi en intervjustudie. 
Vi kontaktar er eftersom vi är intresserade av er kunskap och er roll inom ämnet. Intervjun kommer att 
fokusera på riskanalysernas roll för beslutsprocessen.  Intervjun är uppdelad i 4 delar: bakgrund, risk 
och riskanalyser, beslutsprocessen och förbättringsmöjligheter. Intervjun beräknas ta runt 30 minuter 
och kommer att genomföras via Skype, telefon eller besök beroende på vad som passar bäst. 
Självklart hoppas vi att ni är intresserade av att delta. Har ni ytterligare frågor eller vill delta, vänligen 
kontakta oss antingen på mail eller på telefon1.  
 
Bästa hälsningar 
Albin Karlberg och Olga Nilsson 
Studenter, Civilingenjörsprogrammet i Riskhantering, LTH 
  
                                                     
1 E-mail or telephone number is not included in the report. 
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Appendix B: Interview guide 
The interview guides used during the interviews are shown below. The interviews were held in 
Swedish. 
Interview guide version 1 
The questions from the first interview guide are presented below.  
Stage 1: Individual  
1. What is your background? 
2. What is your current work? 
3. What is risk for you? 
4. What is risk and vulnerability assessment for you? 
Stage 2: Risk and vulnerability assessments 
1. Describe the process you use to assess risk. 
 Probing: What methods do you use? Why? How are uncertainties described? 
Stage 3: Decision making 
1. Could you describe the decision making process related to risk and vulnerability assessments?  
Probing: Role of risk and vulnerability assessment? Other issues? 
2. Which strengths do you see in using risk and vulnerability assessments in the decision making 
process?  
Probing: Why? 
3. Which weaknesses do you see in using risk and vulnerability assessments in the decision 
making process? 
Probing: Why? 
Stage 4: Points of improvement 
1. What problems do you identify with risk and vulnerability assessments as a decision support 
tool? 
Probing: Why? 
2. Do you have any ideas on how risk and vulnerability assessments can be improved to be a 
better support to decisions? 
Probing: Why? 
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Interview guide version 2 
The interview guide was updated after the first two interviews. The order of two questions changed 
and one question was deleted since the respondents answered the same thing on two questions. Also 
more probing questions were added. The changes are marked with bold letters. 
Stage 1: Individual  
1. What is your current work? 
2. What is your background? 
3. What is risk for you? 
4. What is risk assessment for you? 
Probing: What should a risk and vulnerability assessment contain? Why? 
Stage 2: Risk and vulnerability assessments 
1. Describe the process you use to assess risk. 
 Probing: What methods do you use? Why? How are uncertainties described? 
Stage 3: Decision making 
1. Could you describe the decision making process related to risk and vulnerability assessments?  
Probing: Role of risk and vulnerability assessment? Other issues? Who implements the risk 
reducing measures? How are the risk reducing measures funded? 
2. Which strengths do you see in using risk and vulnerability assessments in the decision making 
process? 
Probing: Why? 
3. Which weaknesses do you see in using risk and vulnerability assessments in the decision 
making process? 
Probing: Do you see this as a problem? Why? 
Stage 4: Points of improvement 
1. Do you have any ideas on how risk and vulnerability assessments can be improved to be a 
better support to decisions? 
Probing: Why? 
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Appendix C: Respondents 
Interviews have been conducted with respondents from the organisations below. 
The interviews that did not follow the interview guide are marked with *.  
 
BRM Europe* 
Energimyndigheten 
FOI – Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut 
Justitiedepartementet* 
Länsstyrelsen Gotlands län 
Länsstyrelsen Gävleborg 
Länsstyrelsen Kalmar län 
Länsstyrelsen Stockholm* 
Länsstyrelsen Uppsala Län 
Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap 
Socialstyrelsen 
Trafikverket 
